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Truth Commissions after Economic Crises: Political Learning or Blame Game? 
Iosif Kovras1, Shaun McDaid2 & Ragnar Hjalmarsson 
 
This article addresses an important but understudied aspect of the recent Great Recession in 
Europe: the institutional strategies political elites deployed to address accountability and 
learning, more specifically, truth commissions (TCs). We raise two overlapping, puzzles. The 
first concerns the timing of the decision to adopt an economic TC: whilst Iceland established 
a TC at early stages of the crisis, Greece and Ireland did so much later. What accounts for 
‘early’ versus ‘delayed’ truth seekers? The second concerns variations in learning outcomes. 
Iceland’s commission paved the way for learning institutional lessons, but TCs in Greece and 
Ireland became overtly politicised. What accounts for these divergences? The article 
compares truth commissions in Iceland, Greece and Ireland and identifies two types of 
political learning – institutional and instrumental – related to the establishment of a TC. It 
argues political elites in countries with higher pre-crisis levels of trust in institutions and 
public transparency are more likely to establish economic TCs quickly; this is the 
‘institutional logic’ of learning. The ‘instrumental logic’ of learning, in contrast, leads 
governments interested in apportioning blame to their predecessors to establish commissions. 
 
Introduction 
The recent Great Recession in Europe provides an excellent avenue to explore more 
generally how political elites use institutions to learn from policy failures. Of special 
relevance in this case are the truth commissions (hereafter TCs) established by several 
countries to identify the causes of their economic meltdown. Their goal was to document 
institutional, political and/or individual failures and publish reports offering guidelines for 
institutional, policy and regulatory reforms. These particular TCs constitute an institutional 
innovation. Their sudden appearance, coupled with differences across countries, prompt 
numerous questions, two of which we seek to answer here. First, what explains the decision 
to set up a truth commission after an economic crisis? Is there a uniform explanation for their 
establishment or does this vary? Second, why in certain countries did political elites attempt 
to use TCs for political gain, while in others, they favoured restoring trust to state institutions 
over partisan considerations?  
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The article addresses these questions by looking at three economic TCs: the Icelandic 
Special Investigation Committee (SIC), established in 2008; the Greek Committee on Public 
Debt, established in 2015; and Ireland’s Parliamentary Banking Inquiry, established in 2014. 
From the comparison, it identifies two types of political learning displayed by political elites 
related to the establishment of a TC. The first, institutional learning, applies to countries 
where rebuilding trust after a major economic crisis is important for political elites: here, 
levels of public transparency and trust in institutions were already high in pre-crisis periods, 
and a truth commission appeared in the early stages of crisis. The second, instrumental 
learning, applies to countries where newly elected governments had no direct involvement 
with the arrival or immediate (mis)management of the crisis. Here, TCs were only established 
when seen as expedient, usually before or after critical political events, such as elections or 
IMF bailout negotiations. In effect, they were useful devices to blame predecessors and gain 
electoral spoils. 
The article is divided into seven core sections. The first section outlines what truth 
commissions are and explains why the term can be used to describe the institutions under 
study. The second shows how the concept of political learning can help us understand the 
decision to adopt TCs. Section three discusses the research methodology and design, and 
section four considers several alternative, albeit unsatisfactory, hypotheses as to why 
governments adopt economic TCs. The fifth section develops a new theoretical framework to 
explain the adoption of TCs by governments at either early or late stages: institutional 
learning for early adopters and instrumental learning for late adopters. The final two sections 
explore each type of learning in turn, with case studies of institutional learning (Iceland) and 
instrumental learning (Ireland and Greece). The article concludes by evaluating the success of 
these mechanisms and identifying their flaws. As will be shown, the instrumental approach to 
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learning can backfire on governments, downplaying instead of highlighting the role their 
predecessors played in the crisis.   
 
Truth Commissions, Transitional Justice and Economic Crises 
Transitional justice is a framework usually associated with dealing with the past in 
post-conflict societies (Kritz, 1995). It points to the importance of learning from the past and 
explores the impact of different policies of formal acknowledgement of wrongdoing, 
including prosecutions (Sikkink, 2011), truth commissions (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010), and 
amnesties or partial impunity (McEvoy and Mallinder, 2012) on the quality of the emerging 
political institutions.  
Truth commissions are independent, officially sanctioned, fact-finding mechanisms 
tasked to investigate and document patterns of past human rights violations, often following a 
political transition from conflict to peace or from authoritarianism to democracy (see Hayner 
1994, Freeman 2006, Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010). They are usually vested with investigative 
powers, ranging from subpoenaing and taking testimonies from victims to overseeing 
forensic investigations. They prepare a final report with their findings and offer 
recommendations to improve the quality of human rights. The first truth commissions were 
established in Latin America in an effort to shed light on clandestine patterns of crimes, such 
as finding the whereabouts of the disappeared: those persons kidnapped and secretly buried 
by dictatorial regimes (Kovras 2017). Since then, particularly after the global prominence of 
the post-apartheid South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), truth 
commissions have diffused globally. While TCs have historically been associated with the 
study of violence and political change, their use has become more mainstream, used, for 
example, to analyse economic and social change, both of which have powerful impacts on 
citizens’ lives (Michalowski, 2014).  
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The transitional justice framework – truth commissions in particular – is relevant to 
this study for three reasons. First, transitional justice is conceptually based on the assumption 
that transitions are ‘critical junctures’ and decisions have longer-term potential to determine 
the quality of the emerging democracy (Olsen, et al 2010; Sikkink 2011). It thus implicitly 
considers learning from the past to be an instrument of political and institutional reform. The 
intuitive question in most ‘transitions’ is whether societies who do not deal with past policy 
failures or look for the causes of a crisis are condemned to repeat their mistakes, including in 
the economic sphere. To give a comparative example, on the one hand, despite dealing 
proactively with the human rights abuses of the ‘dirty war’ (1976-1983) (Sikkink, 2011), 
Argentina has not addressed the causes of its economic collapse in the early 2000s (Panizza, 
2014). On the other hand, following the Great Depression of the 1930s, the US Senate 
mandated the Pecora Commission to identify the causes of the 1929 Wall Street Crash. In 
addition to analysing the preconditions, Pecora suggested innovative institutional reforms, 
resulting in the Glass-Steagall Act; this led to the separation of commercial from investment 
banking which ultimately protected markets from a financial crisis for several decades.  
Second, in the aftermath of gross human rights violations and also after economic 
meltdown, state institutions are severely weakened and state-society relations fractured. The 
examination of transitional justice in general and truth commissions in particular can be 
useful to determine how and why political elites deploy (or refrain from using) institutional 
mechanisms to restore trust in the state.  
Third, and most importantly, truth commissions and other truth recovery initiatives 
are mandated to uncover and publicly acknowledge something ‘hidden’ in the past. The first 
truth commissions were established in Latin America to bring the clandestine crimes of 
dictatorial regimes into the clear light of day. Contemporary financial crises are equally 
hidden. They are complex and technical, often occurring in distant or virtual locations, 
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enabling only a minority of experts to understand their root causes (see Helleiner and Pagliari 
2011; Palan, 2006). Economic truth commissions, like their sister commissions in Latin 
America, have the capacity to ‘uncover’ complicated processes unseen by most citizens but 
affecting their daily lives.  
Truth commissions are recognised as establishing simplified, yet authoritative, 
narratives of the causes of crisis that can be easily understood by the general public. These 
backward-looking mechanisms document patterns of political, economic or institutional 
failure; their mandate is restricted temporally, and they are assigned investigative powers. 
The economic commissions discussed here (Iceland, Ireland, Greece) are exemplary of this 
format. Table 1 summarises the composition, mandate and independence of each.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Truth commissions usually include experts, including judicial authorities, academics, 
and public administrators; their concern is identifying broad patterns of political, legal and 
institutional failure. The key objective of their final report is to convert these failures into 
policy recommendations. Because fact-finding commissions have been mushrooming around 
the world, however, we need to distinguish between truth commissions and other truth 
recovery bodies. Otherwise we risk defining all such mechanisms as truth commissions and 
devaluing their unique qualities.  
Truth commissions usually differ from technical commissions or parliamentary 
inquiries in their investigative scope, composition, and the periods under scrutiny. In the 
economic realm, technical reports ordered by politicians or independent authorities tend to 
focus on specific aspects of crises, such as the collapse of a single bank or the role of 
regulators. For example, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) prepared reports on the 
Northern Rock and the Royal Bank of Scotland fiascos (FSA, 2008; 2011). As the mandate 
and the scope of these investigations remained narrow and particular, they cannot be 
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considered truth commissions. The ‘Turner Review’, tasked to identify flaws in the UK 
banking system, had a more expansive target of investigation (FSA, 2009). Still, it was a 
primarily a ‘review’ of existing regulatory practices, not a broader narrative of what went 
wrong. The truth recovery initiatives under scrutiny in this paper have been asked to critique 
the established institutional framework, hence their categorisation as truth commissions. Also 
common to the three cases is the (theoretical) authority vested in them by national 
parliaments, another factor separating TCs from other report-producing bodies serving 
similar functions (Hayner: 1994, p. 604).  
 
The ‘Blind Spot’ of Political Learning 
Political learning has been studied by many scholars in many ways, some considering 
individuals and others focusing on institutions (Soss, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 2007; Bermeo, 
1992). For Nancy Bermeo, political learning is a process whereby beliefs and tactics are 
modified following ‘severe crises, frustrations, and dramatic changes in environment’ (1992, 
p. 274). Such events force re-evaluation of the ideas informing past actions.  
Political economists have already explored learning processes after major crises. 
Many have convincingly illustrated how an economic meltdown can challenge economic 
orthodoxy and engender new ideas in policy-making (Blyth, 2001; Chwieroth, 2010; Hall, 
1986; Culpepper, 2008). And many studies consider the long-term consequences of ideational 
shifts, for example, attitudes to former political regimes (e.g. Sapiro, 1994). However, 
although it is now common wisdom that crises stimulate political learning, we have limited 
knowledge of the institutional mechanisms guiding this process. 
Some say that despite the impact of crises, opportunities for learning and reform are 
lesser than often thought (Boin and ‘t Hart, 2003). Boin et al. contend that whilst one would 
expect ‘political learning to get to the heart of “what went wrong” and ensure that “the facts” 
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become available’ to inform future policy decisions, such an outcome is by no means ‘the 
norm’ (2008, pp. 14-15). They suggest investigations into crises rarely produce clear lessons, 
with some notable exceptions, such as the Hillsborough stadium disaster or the unsafe 
convictions of the ‘Birmingham six’ in the UK. Indeed, they say such investigative 
mechanisms are often themselves sites of contestation and politicised wrangling.     
Such argumentation draws a strict dividing line in the debate on political learning: 
either crises provide valuable opportunities to learn lessons from past mistakes or their 
potential to drive such processes is limited. But is it not also possible that different types of 
learning occur during crises, and these are shaped, at least partially, by the institutional 
mechanisms established to drive the process? In effect, studying the institutional mechanisms 
set up to deal with the crisis, can reveal a lot about whether and how political elites learn 
from the past, and what type of lessons they glean from past policy failure. This is something 
the literature on political learning has not adequately explored.  
Bermeo offers a useful way to examine these themes. Crises, as she puts it, ‘force 
people to re-evaluate the ideas that they have used as guides to action in the past, failures in 
economic policy act as turning points that frequently lead to changes in the priorities, tactics 
and strategies deployed by a “critical mass” of learners’ (Bermeo, 1992, p. 276; emphasis 
added). This allows us to address a blind spot in the literature, the ‘politics’ of political 
learning: whether and to what extent tactical manoeuvrings are driven by genuine imperatives 
of lesson-learning (institutional learning) or by political considerations (instrumental 
learning), or occasionally both.  
Political learning is neither homogenous nor linear. It takes different trajectories, 
shaped by endogenous political realities, including electoral, ideological and symbolic 
politics. Crises may provide opportunities for reform. But they are also ripe moments for 
apportioning blame or seeking electoral gains (Boin et al., 2008; Boin and t’Hart, 2003). In 
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the latter instance, learning is driven (or thwarted) by political actors’ need to legitimize 
favourable discourses (or contest hegemonic narratives) about the origins of crisis: in other 
words, they play the blame game (Hood 2013).  
A final caveat is how to conceptualize learning. Scholars have explored different 
levels of learning, including but not limited to ideas, policies and institutions. In this article, 
we focus on the latter, exploring the institutional mechanisms that convert past failures into 
lessons (for a cleared operationalization of learning please see below). Given the temporal 
proximity of the economic crises and the commissions under investigation, it is impossible to 
trace their full impact on policy or to define major ideational shifts. Although we 
acknowledge the three types of learning occasionally overlap, we focus on institutions, 
believing that the institutional mechanics of learning can reveal a great deal about the other 
two by illuminating the political drivers shaping policy responses.  
 
Puzzles and Research Design 
To understand the institutional strategies political elites deploy to deal with 
accountability and learning from crises, we address two overlapping, puzzling questions. The 
first concerns the timing of the decision to adopt an economic TC: whilst Iceland established 
a TC at early stages of the crisis, Greece and Ireland did so much later. What accounts for 
‘early’ versus ‘delayed’ truth seekers? The second concerns variations in learning outcomes. 
Iceland’s commission paved the way for learning institutional lessons, but TCs in Greece and 
Ireland became overtly politicised. What accounts for these divergences?  
Our questions call for a comparative research design (Lijphart, 1971). Whilst difficult 
to generalize conclusions from single-case studies, large-n quantitative analyses are 
frequently based on ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori, 1970). Small-n comparisons inspire 
more confidence in the accurate measurement of the chosen concepts, a key element in theory 
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development (George and Bennett, 2005). We draw on ‘comparable cases’ that are puzzling 
in their outcomes (Lijphart, 1971; Przeworski and Teune, 1970). More precisely, we compare 
cases with similar background conditions but slightly different policy responses. To 
understand the decision to adopt TCs and the timing, we carry out process-tracing for our 
three case studies based on qualitative interviews with politicians and policy-makers who 
established or participated in the commissions (including the former Finance Minister of 
Iceland and former Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament) and on the archived proceedings 
(George and Bennett, 2005).3 We draw extensively on official publications of the 
commissions, including interim or final reports, minutes from their meetings, press releases, 
and witness statements to the TCs by current and former political leaders in the chosen 
countries, as the most reliable sources to understand both the rationale for their original 
adoption and the scope of their investigation. This is triangulated with references to 
mainstream national newspapers – excluding tabloids -- where appropriate. Our objective is 
to trace the learning process by focusing on the reports of the commissions, hence the focus 
on their proceedings. Such evidence includes the testimony of key political figures in power 
during the crises, as well as those in opposition who won subsequent critical elections. This 
allows us to observe whether, and to what extent, politicians sought to use the TCs 
instrumentally as a partisan blame game or as a non-partisan tool for learning lessons.  
We acknowledge the small number of cases increases the potential for the problem of 
‘too few cases, too many variables’ (Collier 1993). This is not determined by our research 
design but by the fact that the universe of cases is small. Economic TCs are relatively novel. 
Thus, we are analysing a fluid and emerging phenomenon, remaining open to future 
refinement of our hypotheses with the emergence of new cases. To minimize the impact of 
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policymakers and other stakeholders who participated in the commissions under investigation. 
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this methodological reality, we compare three of the most prominent cases whilst ruling out 
several alternative explanatory hypotheses. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
The type of crisis may explain why an economic TC is set up. Greece had a debt 
crisis, whilst Iceland and Ireland had banking crises, possibly making it easier for the former 
to look for individual culprits and for the latter to evade responsibility by pointing to 
‘reckless’ bankers. This hypothesis does not hold, as all three established truth commissions. 
[Table 2 here] 
Structural and political explanations might be more useful. Perhaps it is not solely the 
type or depth of crisis but its political management that matters. As Table 2 shows, in 
countries where leaders negotiated IMF programs, the consequences of the crisis were 
mitigated or spread over a longer period. However, in countries suffering banking-sector 
collapses before emergency financing was agreed upon, the popular pressure to establish a 
TC to ascertain the causes is evident, as in Iceland. But this fails to account for the decision 
of countries already in IMF programs to adopt TCs, like Greece and Ireland. Clearly, the 
situation is complicated, and a single explanation is inadequate.  
 
Institutional v. Instrumental Learning 
A common thread linking all countries experiencing economic crises is the challenge 
to political and judicial institutions. Economic shocks raise questions about accountability, 
responsibility and learning from policy failures. Questions such as ‘whose fault was it?’, 
‘what went wrong?’ or ‘how did our institutions not prevent the disaster?’ are commonly 
asked. The response of political elites and institutions varies according to the expectations of 
the public in different countries.  
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We hypothesize that political leaders in countries with high pre-crisis levels of trust in 
institutions, such as Iceland, will be more responsive to popular calls for accountability 
(Table 3). An institutional logic will drive learning from policy failures, largely 
independently of political considerations or ideology. Here, TCs are useful mechanisms to 
convert failures into lessons to prevent future crises. The logic of institutional learning and 
the need to rebuild trust in institutions are expressed by elites across the political spectrum. 
Thus, we expect an economic TC to be established early in the crisis, irrespective of the 
ideological orientation or the degree of culpability of the incumbent government. Similarly, 
we expect cross-party support for such an endeavour. Institutional learning is premised on 
securing the long-term legitimacy of the democratic regime and trumps short-term party-
based political considerations. Therefore, political elites will establish a TC even if the final 
report risks putting political blame on them, not least because the electoral and legitimacy 
cost of inaction would be much higher. Responsiveness to public calls for accountability and 
learning from one’s own policy failures to strengthen institutions are twin features of 
institutional learning.  
[Table 3 about here] 
This hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence. Table 4 summarizes average 
levels of trust in central political institutions (national parliament, government, judiciary) 
across our cases in the five pre-crisis years, defined here as the signing of an IMF program. 
To measure perceptions of public transparency, we consider the average perception of 
corruption (in parliament and the judiciary) for the same periods, with the most common 
indicators and sources (Eurobarometer, European Social Survey and Corruption Perception 
Index) used to measure trust and transparency. Whilst sometimes contentious, these metrics 
are useful for mapping political trends. A glance at the table shows Iceland is an outlier, with 
considerably higher levels of trust and transparency. In this case, high public expectations of 
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ascertaining responsibility for past failure locked political leaders into a logic of institutional 
learning; this explains why Iceland’s political elites established a commission almost 
immediately and why it was the incumbent government who did so.  
This does not explain the decision to adopt a TC in Greece and Ireland. Here we see a 
second type of learning, instrumental learning. In both countries, there is a minimum level of 
trust in public institutions but is insufficient to lead to the outcome seen in Iceland. Instead, 
TCs emerged as a result of political elites’ decision to play the blame game, with the post-
crisis government hoping to create authoritative public (and finger-pointing) narratives of the 
causes of the crisis to suit its own interests. Learning from the past, then, is instrumental, 
geared towards ideological and policymaking critiques of previous governments, not a bid to 
highlight institutional failures. Simply stated, such TCs are a convenient mechanism to 
instrumentally use past policy failures to perpetuate the new governing party’s discourse of 
blame, and the timing of their adoption depends on a critical election leading to the demise of 
one party and the rise to power of another.  
Two caveats are in order. First, there is a relative dearth of knowledge of the 
operationalization of the concept of learning. Learning means different things to different 
scholars. To explain what learning entails in the contexts of TCs and to support our 
theoretical framework with observable empirical phenomena, we establish three sets of 
indicators to determine the instrumental or institutional pathway of learning, focusing on the 
three key stages in the life of truth commissions: the ‘decision to adopt’, the ‘mandate’ and 
the ‘report’. 
[Table 4 here] 
[Table 5 about here] 
The decision to adopt is crucial, with the potential to explain the timing and political 
dynamics that paved the way for the establishment of the commission in the first instance. 
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When a commission is set up or whether there is cross-party consensus can reveal a lot about 
the instrumental or institutional logic behind it. As existing literature on truth commissions 
explains, the specific mandate is critical in shaping the boundaries of learning (Chapman and 
Ball 2001). What is the temporal scope of investigations? Which issues are included or 
sidelined from its mandate? Does it focus narrowly on bad decision-making of individuals or 
on broader patterns of institutional failure? What is its level of independence from power-
holders? These critical questions shape the type of learning. Finally, the afterlife of the 
commission is pivotal. Does the TC publish a report, and if it does, what type of 
recommendations does it offer?  More importantly, is there a follow-up to implement the 
recommendations or not? These observable indicators can determine whether a particular 
commission is driven by institutional or instrumental learning (Table 5). 
Second, the two types of learning are not mutually exclusive; as will be seen the two 
logics often co-exist, creating a dynamic explanatory framework. In effect, it is not pure 
morality that guides political elites to follow the institutional learning pathway; rather, the 
institutional framework raises the electoral cost of inertia or partisanship. Equally, it may not 
be avarice alone that leads new governments to follow an instrumental pathway, especially as 




Iceland’s Special Investigation Commission  
In October 2008, Iceland’s three major banks collapsed within a week, taking 97% of 
the country’s banking system with them: estimated at $180 billion (USD), this was the third 
largest corporate bankruptcy on record (Johnsen, 2014). The crash ended an unprecedented 
period of growth, facilitated by cheap credit and exponential banking-sector growth, from 
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174% of GDP at the end of 2003 to about 1000% when it unravelled in 2008 (Benediktsdottir 
et al., 2011). A wave of popular protest inundated Reykjavik, creating an urgent need to 
address the causes (Bergmann 2014). Iceland’s Special Investigation Commission 
(henceforth truth commission) was established, the first of its kind in Europe. The process 
paving the way for the commission, its mandate, and scope were all shaped by the 
institutional logic of learning.  
The decision to establish this TC was made by the incumbent government, led by the 
right-wing Independence Party (IP). IP had held power for 18 consecutive years and was 
perceived responsible for the creation and (mis)management of the crisis. The only reason for 
political elites to set up mechanisms that could potentially incriminate them was the fear that 
the political costs of inaction or a cover up might be even greater. As noted above, this is 
arguably more common in countries with established cultures of transparency, accountability 
and trust in institutions. Guided by this logic, only three days after the banking-sector 
collapse, Prime Minister Geir Haarde announced the establishment of an investigative 
mechanism to ‘be clear what happened and why’ (Morgunbladid, 12 October, 2008, pp. 10-
11). The most senior political advisor to the leader of the Social Democratic Alliance (IP’s 
coalition partner) said, ‘It was just the right thing to do; we owed the nation an explanation of 
what went wrong and what needed to be fixed’ (Interview, Kristrún Heimisdóttir, Reykjavik, 
26 May, 2015). Notably, the commission had cross-party consensus, highlighting the priority 
of reinstating the legitimacy of the political system. An opposition leader argued: ‘Geir 
Haarde showed considerable maturity and realized this needed to be done. The events were of 
such magnitude that there would never be any agreement or reconciliation unless they were 
thoroughly investigated’ (Interview, Steingrímur J. Sigfusson, leader, Left-Green Movement 
(LGM), Reykjavik, December 2, 2015).  
15 
 
The Icelandic truth commission’s design and mandate illustrate the institutional logic 
of learning. For one thing, the appointed commissioners reflect the key investigative 
institutions of the country: a Supreme Court Judge, the Parliamentary Ombudsman, and an 
Icelandic-born Yale economist with banking expertise. According to the Speaker of 
Parliament, a member of IP who tabled the bill establishing the TC, it was thought necessary 
that it be headed by ‘irreproachable professionals that were outside of the daily grind of 
politics’ (Interview, Sturla Böðvarsson, Reykjavik, December 1, 2015). Efforts were also 
made to insulate the commission from party politics and reinforce its independence to ensure 
genuine lesson-learning. 
As the TC’s primary objective was to reinstate trust in state institutions fractured by 
the crisis, its mandate and scope were correspondingly broad, namely, to  
seek the truth behind the events leading to, and the causes of, the downfall of the 
Icelandic banks in October 2008, and related events, [to] assess whether mistakes or 
negligence occurred in the course of the implementation of the laws and other rules 
regulating and providing for control of the Icelandic financial sector [and to 
determine] what persons may be responsible. (Althingi, 2008)  
Political leaders understood its open-ended scope to be central in regaining citizens’ trust. 
According to LGM’s leader and later Minister of Finance, ‘politicians realized that this (the 
SIC) could not be a compromise; this needed to be for real – otherwise there would be no 
trust’ (Interview Steingrimur J. Sigfusson, Reykjavik, December 2, 2015).  
To carry out the demanding investigative task, the commissioners were given 
exceptional investigative powers, including but not limited to subpoenaing witnesses, seizing 
evidence and searching premises. Obstructing the investigation was punishable by up to two 
years’ imprisonment. Ultimately, the TC interviewed 147 witnesses.  
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To increase the potential for learning, the proceedings took place behind closed doors, 
and witnesses were given guarantees that statements made to the commission could not be 
used against them before any courts. This was to make participants feel comfortable enough 
to share their knowledge and at the same time to ‘avoid rehearsed, standardized responses 
that are designed for media headlines and shifting responsibility on to others’ (Anonymous 
interview SIC researcher, Reykjavik, November 30, 2015).  In some cases, when the 
microphones were turned off and the official interview was over, witnesses were encouraged 
to talk ‘off the record’. In short, identifying failures and learning from them seems to have 
been the genuine guiding principle. 
Finally, the institutional logic of learning is evidenced in the follow-up activities. In 
response to the commission’s report, the new left-wing government appointed a special 
working group of legal and public administration academics; this group made further 
recommendations on how the cabinet and individual governmental institutions should 
respond (Forsaetisraduneytid, 2010). Over and above the executive’s initial response, 
Parliament established a cross-political parliamentary committee to ‘draw lessons from the 
SIC report and point to ways for reform’. In September 2010, five months after the 
commission delivered its findings, the all-party committee published a 265-page report 
distilling the findings and noting the lessons to be learned. Based on this report, Parliament 
unanimously passed a resolution setting out a legislative reform agenda. ‘It is important that 
the SIC report continues to be a guiding light,’ it said. Further, ‘it is important that everyone 
looks critically at their own actions and uses the opportunity that the report offers to improve 
society’ (Althingi 2010).  
The Icelandic TC is the only mechanism in our cases to be guided by the institutional 
logic of learning and honouring the need to rebuild the trust of the public in institutions. In 
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sharp contrast to the other two examples, it was swiftly established, largely independent, and 
legitimized by ongoing cross-party consensus.  
 
Instrumental Learning  
Greece’s Debt Audit Committee 
The economic crisis radically restructured Greece’s political system (Kalyvas, 2015; 
Kovras & Loizides 2014; Pappas, 2014). Support for the dominant parties, socialist PASOK 
and conservative New Democracy (ND), nose-dived. Political polarization was reflected in 
violent street protests, riots and the electoral rise of the far right (Ellinas 2013; Ellinas & 
Lamprianou 2014) The most important political development was the transformation of the 
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) from a fringe party into a dominant one. The creation 
of Greece’s TC reflects SYRIZA’s rise, lending credence to our proposed theoretical 
framework of learning.  
Despite deep recession, skyrocketing unemployment, vocal calls for accountability 
and violent street protest during the first four years of the crisis (2010-2014), attempts to 
investigate the causes were blocked by the dominant parties amidst the pressing need to 
implement a harsh austerity program. During these years, ND and PASOK, seen as 
responsible for creating the exorbitant Greek debt, became coalition partners, with little 
incentive to investigate their own policy failures. However, SYRIZA was keen to apportion 
blame to ND and PASOK and create a new (politically favourable) narrative to bolster its 
legitimacy. Accordingly, three months after gaining power (April 2015), SYRIZA established 
a debt audit committee (hencefore the truth commission).   
Such a move is not unique to Greece. Many leaders create mechanisms to settle old 
scores against competing political elites. What is exceptional in the Greek case is its 
extension of the blame game to include external actors, by challenging the legitimacy of 
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Greek debt and seeking to negotiate a new program with its creditors. SYRIZA’s logic is best 
expressed by former Speaker of Parliament Zoe Konstantopoulou, the politician who created 
the truth commission:  
The current government is the first in decades that did not contribute to the creation of 
the public debt … [T]he government is legitimized to use all available tools and 
arguments in order to challenge and write-off the debt, or at least to stop repaying it 
for so long as it threatens the survival and the civil and economic rights of the Greek 
people.  
The instrumental drive of the commission is evident in its (ideological) origins. According to 
Konstantopoulou, it emphasised the international systemic causes of the crisis, such as the 
external conditionality imposed by the creditors and its impact on national sovereignty, and 
played up the human rights of the Greek people (Interview Zoe Konstantopoulou, London, 12 
December 2015).  
In short, Greek ideological instrumentalism was expressed in the effort to establish a 
narrative supporting the view that since the debt was created by systemic international 
influences, it was illegal. If this narrative were established, it could be used as leverage in 
ongoing negotiations with creditors to forgive the debt. To this end, the commission was 
mandated to: 
[G]ather all information relevant to the emergence and disproportionate increase in 
public debt, and to subject the data to scientific scrutiny in order to determine which 
part of the debt can be identified as illegitimate and illegal, odious or unsustainable, 
during the bailout period, from May 2010 to January 2015 as well as in the preceding 
years. (Greek Debt Committee, 2015) 
The Greek TC was established in April 2015, shortly after SYRIZA’s victory, as a 
special independent commission of Parliament. Its opening session was a highly visible event 
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addressed by the President of the Republic and attended by the Prime Minister. In sharp 
contrast to other TCs staffed by experts or politicians, the Greek commission included anyone 
who might be interested, from international civil society organizations to a folk singer. A key 
feature was its exclusive focus on the public debt and its exclusion of broader issues of 
domestic institutional failure. The narrow temporal scope, the ‘bailout’ period (2010-2015), is 
equally noteworthy. The Greek problem was framed as one created after the imposition of 
external conditionality in 2010, thereby excluding from scrutiny any endogenous institutional 
failures (i.e. corruption, tax evasion, party patronage) contributing to the debt in preceding 
decades.  
Guided by this instrumental logic, the TC became a political tool to hit two targets at 
once. First, it was intended to strengthen the position of the Greek government in 
renegotiating the terms of previous Troika (IMF-EU-ECB) programs. It had a predetermined 
conclusion, evident in its slogan: ‘Audit the debt, write it off’. As the lead expert of the 
commission, Eric Toussaint, unambiguously stated, it could ‘arm the Greek government with 
legal arguments on the matter of partial debt abolition during the negotiations in relation to 
this matter … we will determine which part of the debt can be qualified as illegitimate, 
illegal, odious, or unsustainable’ (cited in Papagiannis, 2015). Auditing Greek public debt 
over three decades was a Herculean task. Nevertheless, the commission published its 
preliminary findings two months (June 2015) after its first meeting and only two weeks 
before the Greek government called a referendum on the terms of the new Troika program. 
The timing highlights its politicized role. Not surprisingly, given the TC’s ideological origins, 
the preliminary report concluded Greece was ‘a victim of an attack premeditated and 
organized by the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission’ (Greek Debt Committee 
2015, p. 2).  
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Second, the commission took aim at opposing domestic political elites. Although the 
debt was a ‘premeditated’ international plan, the report found ‘Greek authorities conspired’ to 
protect domestic and international financial institutions (Greek Debt Committee 2015, p. 1). 
Greek politicians deemed responsible were not framed as incompetent or reckless 
policymakers, but as conspirators in a consortium of foreign interests. This overlapped with a 
broader political narrative in which the government was (or should be) the guardian of 
national sovereignty. The leader of the populist right Independent Greeks (ANEL), 
SYRIZA’s junior coalition partner, argued:  
Certain politicians refrain from attending this commission, and most of them 
participated in (previous) governments that surrendered the country and its national 
sovereignty over the past few years. Was this unintentional or on purpose? The 
commission will prove that some of them benefitted from this policy. (Greek Truth 
Committee session, 5 April, 2015)  
Paradoxically, although Greece faced a domestic public debt problem and had most to learn 
from illuminating well-entrenched endogenous institutional flaws, the TC virtually ignored 
these. By limiting its analytical gaze to systemic and external failures, it forestalled lessons 
useful for domestic reforms. Endemic problems such as corruption were either side-lined or 
framed as externally driven.   
The abrupt termination of the Greek TC best illustrates its instrumental nature. Within 
weeks of SYRIZA’s signing of a new Troika program, in July 2015, the party withdrew its 
support from the TC. It did not even get to publish a final report4. After this volte face, the TC 
was irrelevant; in fact, continuing the investigation might have been perilous for SYRIZA. 
Several MPs perceived the leadership’s decision to agree to a new Troika program in the 
summer of 2015 as capitulation. This led to a wave of MP defections, trimming the party’s 
                                            
4
 It should be noted that the Greek debt committee continued its operation even after the defection of most 
politicians supporting the commission from SYRIZA. Yet, after 2015 it had no official mandate and thereby it is 
could not be considered as a TC. 
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power to pass bills necessary to receive the new loans. These bills passed with the support of 
opposition parties, making it impossible for the government to settle scores with the 
opposition whilst simultaneously depending on them. Moreover, any ongoing investigative 
mechanism could backfire; for example, it might highlight the mismanagement of the 
negotiations and the adverse impact of SYRIZA’s economic policy whilst in power, 
including the imposition of capital controls. For instance, members of the committee 
published an additional report showing the illegality of the memorandum signed by SYRIZA 
in July 2015. The former Speaker of Parliament who led the commission is adamant: ‘The 
continuation of the truth commission would have exposed the role of the government’ 
(Interview Zoe Konstantopoulou, London, 12 December 2015).  
 
Ireland’s Banking Inquiry Commission 
Irish attempts to learn lessons from its banking crisis were significantly delayed, but 
before entering the EU/IMF program in November 2010, the incumbent government began 
investigating the crisis. Its investigations produced three technocratic reports on banking and 
regulatory failures (Oireachtas, 2010a, b) and the failure of policy-makers to assess risks 
(Oireachtas, 2011). Such an approach, although potentially illuminating, was at odds with 
fuller lesson-learning. It was not until after a critical election that a new government 
established a Banking Inquiry (henceforth the truth commission) to examine the factors 
leading to the Irish collapse from 1992 onwards.  
The Irish TC took an instrumental approach to lesson-learning.  As in Greece, the 
economic crisis ruptured the party system. The dominant party, the centre-right/populist 
Fianna Fáil (FF), was relegated to third place for the first time in its history (Hutcheson, 
2011). In 2011, it was replaced by a coalition of the centre-right/conservative Fine Gael (FG), 
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and social-democratic/centrist Irish Labour (Labour 2011). This change in government 
spurred politicised attempts to establish accountability.  
Following the election, proposals to strengthen the powers of parliamentary inquiries 
were advanced as part of the government’s coalition program, requiring approval in a 
referendum. In a pre-emptive move, the coalition stated that a banking inquiry would begin 
once such powers were acquired (although the original plans to increase powers of 
investigation were unconnected to the crisis). The referendum in October 2011 was narrowly 
defeated. This stymied the government which had hoped to use the new powers to plan a 
‘lengthy and detailed embarrassment of Fianna Fáil’s stewardship of economic and banking 
matters’ (Leahy, 2013).  
Nevertheless, a TC was established by statute in late 2014, comprising politicians 
from all parties, and independents (Oireachtas 2015). Despite the ostensible motivation of 
truth-seeking, it displayed a combination of instrumental learning and adversarial politics, 
quickly undermining its credibility. For example, the government insisted on adding two of 
its parliamentarians to the committee to ensure a majority, enabling it to set the terms of 
reference – although the TC itself was technically independent.  
The TC heard testimony from current and former Prime Ministers, civil servants, 
bankers and economists. Calling on key parliamentary figures to testify was part of an 
instrumental approach to learning and highlighted the ongoing antagonism between 
politicians. Members of the FF-led government, which presided over the initial Troika 
program, understandably stressed their achievements before the crisis. Former FF Prime 
Minister, Brian Cowen (also a Finance Minister) mentioned the huge reductions in debt-to-
GDP ratios during his tenure; he further argued there was no indication in any of the advice 
he received that Ireland was headed for catastrophe (Brian Cowen, Banking Inquiry (BI), 
Witness Statement (WS), 2 July, 2015).  
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For his part, his predecessor, Bertie Ahern, expressed sorrow that the crisis occurred, 
but claimed his governments had been fiscally responsible: ‘Those who say we squandered 
the boom forget that in my time as Taoiseach we actually recorded budget surpluses in 10 of 
our 11 budgets … As a result, Ireland paid over a billion euro less every year in interest 
payments’ (Bertie Ahern, BI, WS, 16 July 2015). When questioned more closely, Ahern 
admitted 2008 levels of spending were too high, but contended that had he listened to the 
opposition, he would have ‘spent three times more’ (Bertie Ahern, BI, Evidence (E), July 16, 
2015). The implication was that any party in power would have had similar results – thus, by 
this logic, neither he nor his party was responsible for the crisis.   
Those representing the coalition government (FG and Labour) behaved in a similar 
fashion, highlighting their pre-crash achievements and placing the blame for domestic 
failures at the door of FF-led administrations. Deputy Prime Minister Joan Burton (Labour) 
claimed the previous government was largely at fault, stressing her own role in warning 
against its policies: 
[A] series of catastrophic economic policy decisions by the Fianna Fáil/Progressive 
Democrat Government created a huge distortion in the structure of the Irish 
economy…. I warned time and again against the property–based tax breaks fuelling 
this bubble ... Those responsible were the Fianna Fail led Government, the boards of 
the banks, the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator. (Joan Burton, BI, WS, 23 
July 2015) 
But this approach backfired. When the Labour Party’s policies in opposition were questioned 
at the TC, it transpired it had also suggested reducing taxes. Indeed, before the 2007 election, 
it agreed on a joint platform with FG, advocating public spending increases. When this was 
put to FG leader Enda Kenny, he denied FG was anything like FF, referencing his party’s 
emphasis on competitiveness: ‘You make the point that, you know, we were advocating even 
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for more public spending. Well, far from that, because a central focus of our opposition to 
Government was the massive waste and the inefficiency’ (Enda Kenny, BI, E, 23 July 2015). 
Kenny also claimed FG’s projections were based on figures from the Department of Finance 
or Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) – the same defence used by Ahern and 
Cowen. This shows the potentially counter-productive nature of the Irish approach. As 
independent parliamentarian Shane Ross (an expert on banking) argued: ‘The conclusion is 
awkward. If Fine Gael swallowed the line from the ESRI and the Department of Finance, 
does that not let Fianna Fail off the hook?’ (Ross, 2015). Even Kenny’s fellow party 
members who were on the TC grilled him and the Employment Minister over their policies in 
opposition. Some had voted against Kenny in a leadership challenge in 2010, and it has been 
suggested they were only available for TC duties because they had no cabinet responsibilities 
(Enda Kenny and Richard Bruton, BI, E, 23 July 2015). In other words, the instrumental 
nature of the TC went beyond fighting between different parties to encompass intra-party 
squabbles.   
The Irish electoral system may help explain the fate of the country’s TC. The PR-STV 
system means electors vote for personalities, not parties (Kirby and Murphy, 2011). Thus, 
while the TC was a classic attempt at instrumental learning, its adversarial nature stopped it 
from becoming a simple witch-hunt of the previous government. The final report further 
supports our hypothesis of political culpability. Whilst the coalition government attempted to 
use the TC instrumentally, the TC’s report shared responsibility among the parties:  
All the main political parties, whether in opposition or in government, advocated pro-
cyclical fiscal policies, including increasing expenditure and reducing taxation, in the 
years leading up to the crisis, as evidenced by their election manifestos in the 2002 




Its recommendations vis-à-vis government included reforming the management of 
transaction-based taxes and providing parliamentarians with ‘training and support in technical 
content if they do not already possess the required skill set’ (Oireachtas, 2016, vol. 1, p. 14), 
sparing any single party or politician from censure.  Even a report written by one of the 
independent members, whilst most critical of the FF-led government, allocates blame across 
the political establishment, reckless bankers, and the ‘non-opposition’ rather than 
apportioning all the blame to the government presiding over the slide into crisis (Higgins, 
2016). In the Irish case, then, the attempt to use a TC instrumentally backfired on those who 
sought to profit from it politically. 
 
Conclusion: Truth Commissions and Omissions 
To relieve economic stress, most economists focus on forward-looking policies to 
stimulate economic recovery. This study of three European countries, however, shows how 
difficult it is for politicians to resist delving into past policy failures. Under certain 
conditions, this can be beneficial. By shedding light on the causes of the 1929 crash, the 
Pecora Commission was able to recommend a number of institutional reforms that protected 
the US economy from another major crisis for decades. If they are properly designed, TCs 
have the potential to convert past policy failures into institutional lessons that could protect 
national economies from past failures. 
Yet by seeking to understand what went wrong and to learn from past mistakes, a 
state accepts (tacitly at least) a role for itself in preventing future crises. This, in turn, implies 
new and innovative or additional forms of regulation in the spheres of capital and economic 
development, with obvious implications for the realms of taxation, regulation, and state-led 
economic planning, as for example, how to avoid pro-cyclical policies which can fuel the 
speculative ‘bubbles’ affecting the three case studies. How this can be done in an era of 
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transnational capital flows has been the subject of considerable debate (see e.g. Helleiner, 
2015; Piketty, 2014), and proposing solutions is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the challenges faced by states are not merely 
economic – they are also inherently political. Those favouring a greater role for the state in 
economic and capital regulation may find themselves increasingly at odds with populist 
movements, nativist in outlook, which see more government as part of the problem (Canovan, 
1999; Tope et al., 2015). The simplified narratives provided by TCs may struggle to compete 
with the even more simplified arguments of populists who seek to refashion the system in 
their own image, rather than refresh and reform it.  
TCs should not automatically be viewed as universally positive mechanisms. They 
can be used instrumentally, as in Greece and Ireland, for party political purposes; 
unfortunately, these can trim the perceived legitimacy of the existing political process and 
fuel the nativist and populist impulses which threaten the global and globalised economic 
system. That being said, the existence of an established culture of public transparency and 
pre-crisis trust in political institutions, as in Iceland, can lock political actors into a policy of 
delving into the past; in such cases, efforts to abstain or to cover up responsibility could be 
electorally costly. This type of broad political consensus on the need to scrutinize past policy 
failures guides institutional learning.  
In our analysis of three different economic truth commissions, we have identified 
what we could term a learning paradox: although societies with weaker cultures of 
transparency could benefit most from learning institutional lessons from crises, institutional 
learning is most difficult in those particular countries. We also find tensions between political 
learning and realpolitik. The stated objective of TCs is to learn from past policy failures. Yet 
once they start highlighting complicated aspects of the truth, those most useful for lesson-
learning, they are frequently stymied by politicians interested in a simplified narrative which 
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excludes inconvenient truths, as in Greece and Ireland. Contemporary financial crises are 
complex phenomena with technical, institutional, regulatory, and individual decision-making 
flaws. Converting a complicated phenomenon into a simplified narrative is both the virtue 
and the vice of a TC – akin to truth recovery mechanisms. Commissioners are tasked with 
converting complex processes into a publicly accessible narrative while offering 
recommendations to prevent future disasters, the essence of political learning. However, 
because they have the ability to create meta-narratives about the crisis, TCs become ideal 
instruments of symbolic politics, or realpolitik, for politicians seeking to establish expedient 
narratives and settle old scores.  
From our analysis, it is clear that new governments enjoying comfortable majorities 
after critical elections may use TCs instrumentally to apportion blame and capitalize on 
public discontent to achieve the ‘constant end’ of electoral success (Bermeo, 1992). Yet all 
parties acknowledge the pragmatic need to maintain governmental stability as a prerequisite 
of effective decision-making to overcome deep economic crises. In times of economic stress, 
effective governance often necessitates consensus with the opposition who may have 
skeletons in their closets and, thus, prefer to block backward-looking accountability 
mechanisms. Thus, it seems realpolitik trumps learning initiatives in times of crisis. TCs lose 
their appeal and utility, when they reveal inconvenient truths about the parties establishing 
them. In such contexts, political elites reframe their political narratives from backward-
looking mechanisms of accountability to forward-looking policies aimed at resuscitating the 
economy. In a final analysis, the establishment of economic TCs for instrumental reasons, 
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Table 4: Average Pre-Crisis levels of Trust in Institutions (Judiciary, Parliament, 








Greece 49.10% 4,36 
Iceland 59.70% 9,38 
Ireland 40.80% 7,6 
 
Note: Period under investigation 5 years prior to the signing of the IMF program.  
Sources: Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, Corruption Perception Index 
(Transparency International). 
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